Name: Working Without a Net: A Study of Egocentric Epistemology (en Inglés)
Price: 1057.22 PEN
Availability: InStock
Author: Richard Foley
ISBN: 9780195076998

portada Working Without a Net: A Study of Egocentric Epistemology (en Inglés)

Formato

Libro Físico

Editorial

Oxford University Press

Autor

Richard Foley

Año

1992

Idioma

Inglés

N° páginas

224

Encuadernación

Tapa Dura

ISBN

0195076990

ISBN13

9780195076998

N° edición

Categorías

Epistemología y teoría del conocimiento

Working Without a Net: A Study of Egocentric Epistemology (en Inglés)

Richard Foley (Autor) · Oxford University Press · Tapa Dura

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S/ 1.057,22

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Reseña del libro "Working Without a Net: A Study of Egocentric Epistemology (en Inglés)"

In this new book, Foley defends an epistemology that takes seriously the perspectives of individual thinkers. He argues that having rational opinions is a matter of meeting our own internal standards rather than standards that are somehow imposed upon us from the outside. It is a matter of making ourselves invulnerable to intellectual self-criticism. Foley also shows how the theory of rational belief is part of a general theory of rationality. He thus avoids treating the rationality of belief as a fundamentally different kind of phenomenon from the rationality of decision or action. His approach generates promising suggestions about a wide range of issues--e.g., the distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic reasons for belief; the question of what aspects of the Cartesian project are still worth doing; the significance of simplicity and other theoretical virtues; the relevance of skeptical hypotheses; the difference between a theory of rational belief and a theory of knowledge; the difference between a theory of rational belief and a theory of rational degrees of belief; and the limits of idealization in epistemology.