Reseña del libro "Waffen SS Divisions 3th Totenkopf to 5th Wiking (en Inglés)"
Anglo-German Relations from Munich to Prague Upon his return from the Munich Conference, Mr. Chamberlain, the British Prime Minister, no doubt fully intended to carry out a policy of peace. But the Conservative Opposition was of a different mind, and Chamberlain was therefore unable to put the Anglo-German rapprochement on a firm basis. Munich was a bud which failed to blossom. The tension created by Italy's claims in the Mediterranean compelled Chamberlain to speed up the pace and volume of the British rearmament program. Furthermore, as early as October 1938, Hitler found himself obliged, as a result of statements by British politicians about the fate of German citizens inside the Reich, to protest against London's attitude of "governess-like guardianship." The Reich, he said, did not bother itself about similar matters in the British Empire -- referring to events in Palestine (G 219). On January 30, 1939, Hitler emphasized in a speech to the Reichstag that National Socialist Germany and Fascist Italy were strong enough to win any conflict frivolously caused by irresponsible persons. Germany, he said, had no territorial demands to make on England and France, except the return of her colonies. There was not a single German, especially no National Socialist, "who had any thought of making difficulties for the British Empire" (G 241). In February and March he delivered other speeches of a similar import. To sum up, the causes for the growing tension between the Axis Powers on one hand and Britain and France on the other were: the rivalry between Italy and France in the Mediterranean, which indirectly made Anglo-German relations worse; the exaggerated notions about Germany's expansionist aims in Southeastern Europe; and the difference in Weltanschauung represented by the British and the National Socialist Governments.
