Name: The Third Macedonian War and Battle of Pydna: Perseus' Neglect of Combined-Arms Tactics and the Real Reasons for the Roman Victory (en Inglés)
Price: 97.08 PEN
Availability: InStock
Author: Wrightson, Graham
ISBN: 9781526793508

portada The Third Macedonian War and Battle of Pydna: Perseus' Neglect of Combined-Arms Tactics and the Real Reasons for the Roman Victory (en Inglés)

Formato

Libro Físico

Autor

Graham Wrightson

Editorial

Pen & Sword Military

Idioma

Inglés

N° páginas

208

Encuadernación

Tapa Dura

Dimensiones

23.6 x 15.8 x 2.6 cm

Peso

0.48 kg.

ISBN13

9781526793508

Categorías

Antiguo roma
Historia de roma
Guerra en la antigüedad

The Third Macedonian War and Battle of Pydna: Perseus' Neglect of Combined-Arms Tactics and the Real Reasons for the Roman Victory (en Inglés)

Graham Wrightson (Autor) · Pen & Sword Military · Tapa Dura

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S/ 194,16

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Origen: Reino Unido (Costos de importación incluídos en el precio)

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Reseña del libro "The Third Macedonian War and Battle of Pydna: Perseus' Neglect of Combined-Arms Tactics and the Real Reasons for the Roman Victory (en Inglés)"

This is a fascinating and thoroughly researched study of these dramatic events that adds fresh insight to the question of the legion's supposed innate supremacy over the phalanx.The Third Roman-Macedonian War was a disaster for Macedon, a defeat leading to the end of that kingdom's independence. This is usually attributed to an innate superiority of the Roman legionary tactics over the Macedonian system. Graham Wrightson, on the other hand, argues that the blame lies entirely with Perseus, the last king of Macedon. He analyzes the whole war, following the primary source accounts and focusing on Perseus' military decisions and his battlefield strategies. It confirms the prevailing view of the sources that Perseus was too hesitant and non-committal in his early conduct of the war. More significantly it argues that Perseus mishandled the Macedonian army when it comes to combined-arms tactics by adopting a defensive posture, particularly at the final battle of Pydna. The Macedonian military system based on a slow sarissa phalanx is suited entirely to an offensive battle plan coordinating a frontally irresistible phalanx in the center and a rapid heavy cavalry attack on one wing. Most importantly, though, Perseus refused to spend money to hire 10,000 Gallic horsemen and the lack of cavalry cost him the initiative and the victory.This is a fascinating and thoroughly researched study of these dramatic events that adds fresh insight to the question of the legion's supposed supremacy over the phalanx.