Name: Deliberate Discretion? Paperback: The Institutional Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy (Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics) (en Inglés)
Price: 162.47 PEN
Availability: InStock
Author: Huber, John D. ; Shipan, Charles R.
ISBN: 9780521520706

portada Deliberate Discretion? Paperback: The Institutional Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy (Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics) (en Inglés)

Formato

Libro Físico

Autor

John D. Huber

Charles R. Shipan

Editorial

Cambridge University Press

Año

2002

Idioma

Inglés

N° páginas

304

Encuadernación

Tapa Blanda

Dimensiones

22.7 x 15.2 x 1.9 cm

Peso

0.41 kg.

ISBN

9780521520706

ISBN13

9780521520706

Categorías

Política comparada

Deliberate Discretion? Paperback: The Institutional Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy (Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics) (en Inglés)

John D. Huber (Autor) · Charles R. Shipan (Autor) · Cambridge University Press · Tapa Blanda

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Reseña del libro "Deliberate Discretion? Paperback: The Institutional Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy (Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics) (en Inglés)"

The laws that legislatures adopt provide a crucial opportunity for elected politicians to define public policy. But the ways politicians use laws to shape policy vary considerably across polities. In some cases, legislatures adopt detailed and specific laws in an effort to micromanage policymaking processes. In others, they adopt general and vague laws that leave the executive and bureaucrats substantial discretion to fill in the policy details. What explains these differences across political systems, and how do they matter? The authors address these issues by developing and testing a comparative theory of how laws shape bureaucratic autonomy. Drawing on a range of evidence from advanced parliamentary democracies and the U.S. States, they argue that particular institutional forms--such as the nature of electoral laws, the structure of the legal system, and the professionalism of the legislature--have a systematic and predictable effect on how politicians use laws to shape the policymaking process.