Name: Blinding the Enemy: Soviet Tactical Reconnaissance in the Rear Area (en Inglés)
Price: 99.59 PEN
Availability: InStock
Author: Studies, School Of Advanced Military ; Bolzak, Infantry Major Jerry R.
ISBN: 9781479324163

portada Blinding the Enemy: Soviet Tactical Reconnaissance in the Rear Area (en Inglés)

Formato

Libro Físico

Autor

Infantry Major Jerry R. Bolzak

Contribuciones de

School Of Advanced Military Studies

Editorial

Createspace Independent Publishing Platform

Idioma

Inglés

N° páginas

Encuadernación

Tapa Blanda

Dimensiones

28.0 x 21.6 x 0.4 cm

Peso

0.19 kg.

ISBN13

9781479324163

Categorías

Historia militar

Blinding the Enemy: Soviet Tactical Reconnaissance in the Rear Area (en Inglés)

Infantry Major Jerry R. Bolzak (Autor) · School Of Advanced Military Studies (Contribuciones de) · Createspace Independent Publishing Platform · Tapa Blanda

Libro Nuevo

S/ 99,59

S/ 199,17

Ahorras: S/ 99,59

50% descuento

Envío normal

Origen: Estados Unidos (Costos de importación incluídos en el precio)

Se enviará desde nuestra bodega entre el Jueves 25 de Julio y el Lunes 05 de Agosto.

Lo recibirás en cualquier lugar de Perú entre 2 y 5 días hábiles luego del envío.

Reseña del libro "Blinding the Enemy: Soviet Tactical Reconnaissance in the Rear Area (en Inglés)"

This monograph examines Soviet tactical reconnaissance doctrine, organizations, and capability. The Soviet capability is analyzed using their own criteria for the conduct of tactical reconnaissance operations: purposefulness, aggressiveness, continuity, timeliness, and reliability. Soviet and Warsaw Pact Army documents (in translation) are used extensively. A recent Combined Arms Center study concluded that the US Army's counter reconnaissance doctrine, force structure, and training are deficient. Beginning with this assertion, the monograph briefly explores the historical and current relationship between effective tactical reconnaissance and success on the battlefield. Then a detailed analysis of the Soviet reconnaissance capability determines that, despite difficulties in executing their doctrine, the Soviets possess a significant capability for "seeing" through the depth of the modern battlefield. The monograph stresses the correlation between the Soviet reconnaissance effort and their doctrine of developing operations into the tactical and operational depth of the battlefield. Consequently, Soviet reconnaissance patrols will operation in American rear areas. The monograph concludes with the suggestion that the US Army should place greater emphasis on counter reconnaissance in its own rear areas - in effect, blinding the enemy.